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ABSTRACT
Security of information passing through the Internet is threatened
by today’s most advanced malware ranging from orchestrated bot-
nets to much simpler polymorphic worms. These threads, as exam-
ples of zero-day attacks, are able to change their behavior several
times at the early phases of their existence to bypass the network
intrusion detection systems (NIDS). It is known that even well-
designed, and frequently-updated signature-based NIDS cannot
detect the zero-day treats due to the lack of an adequate signature
database, adaptive to intelligent attacks on the Internet. On the
other hand, applying traditional machine learning methods could
not narrow this gap. More importantly, having an NIDS, it should be
tested on malicious traffic dataset that not only represents known
attacks, but also can to some extent reflect the characteristics of
unknown, zero-day attacks. Generating such traffic is identified
in the literature as one of the main obstacles for evaluating the
effectiveness of NIDS.
To address these issues, we apply Recurrent Neural Networks
(RNNs) known as powerful tools in finding complex patterns and
generating similar ones. In this regard, we first examine whether
it is possible to generate new, unseen mutants of a polymorphic
worm. Our results demonstrate that our synthetic mutants exhibit
the same characteristics as the original mutants, i.e., knownmutants
fed into the RNN. Besides, we assess the ability of RNNs to generate
synthetic signatures from the most advanced malware. We claim
that by adding the RNN-generated, synthetic signatures to the set
of the signatures of a signature-based NIDS it is possible to improve
the malware detection rate of that. To support this and evaluate the
feasibility of our approach, we conduct extensive experiments and
provide exhaustive discussion on our experimental results.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays we are witnessing rapidly escalating Internet threats,
which have become increasingly mature as the Internet and its ap-
plications evolve. Today’s Internet provides ubiquitous connectivity
to a wide range of devices, with different operating systems, which
indeed expands the available attack surface including several differ-
ent attack vectors. The attack vectors we refer to here are activities
attempting to compromise one, or a set, of the goals of information
security: integrity, confidentiality or availability of a resource [48].
Among those malicious activities, several classes of attacks can be
recognized, for instance, Denial of Service (DoS) [36], disclosure,
manipulation, impersonation, and repudiation. These classes can be
lumped together by an umbrella term, namely intrusion. Symantec
1reports annually about attacks and the events recorded from about
126 million attack sensors. According to the recent Symantec report,
in comparison to the previous year (i.e., 2016), a significant increase
in the number of attacks can be seen in general. This increase can
be observed in different classes of attacks, e.g., internet of things
(IoT) devices (more than 600%), new downloader variants (more
than 92%), etc. [53]. This increase has been partially fueled by the
increased availability of user-friendly hacking tools, demanding
solely superficial knowledge from attackers, as illustrated first by
Lipson [35] and further extended in [1].
Along with the emergence of increasingly sophisticated intru-
sions, for instance, what has been listed above, intrusion detection
system (IDS) have been developed to cope with these threats. Re-
garding where or at which point an IDS is placed, two types of such
systems can be distinguished: network intrusion detection system
(NIDS), and host intrusion detection system (HIDS) [12]. The latter
is run on a device or an individual host in the network, whereas an
NIDS is located within the network, at a strategic point, to monitor
the traffic to and from all devices. Irrespective of this classification,
the intrusion detection systems share some commonalities; first,
they take advantage of the connectivity provided by networks, and
secondly, they either use the known, specific patterns or apply
anomaly detection techniques. Anomaly detection-based systems
aim to establish intrusion behavior patterns, being different from
the normal behavior of the system, and consequently, they are appli-
cable to detect intrusions [65]. Although anomaly detection-based
NIDS can be employed to detect previously unknown malicious
activities, the main drawback of these systems is the high level
of false positive, i.e., a legitimate activity may be categorized as
malicious [16].
On the other hand, signature-based detection systems attempt to
match a known pattern, a so-called “signature” or “rule”, with the
contents of packets [11]. To this end, after receiving an incoming
traffic, it undergoes a careful and continual process of analyzing
and possibly generating signatures. This approach is similar to
virus scanning mechanisms, where the database of the signatures,
1Symantec has established the largest civilian threat collection network in the world,
and has one of the most comprehensive collections of cyber security threat intelligence
through the Symantec Global Intelligence NetworkTM [52]
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should be kept updated that can take from a few minutes to a
few days. Despite this fact, the alternative method, i.e., anomaly-
based detection, may require more processing power than signature-
based ones. Additionally, in highly dynamic environments it can
be challenging to train anomaly-based detectors; however, a less
number of rules are required in comparison to signature-based
systems. Nevertheless, a careful signature definition can enable us to
benefit from some of the advantages of using anomaly detector [37].
The result of the signature generation process should be a set of
effective signatures, being narrowed down enough to characterize
a specific attack, but flexible enough to detect some variations
or modifications in an attack [28]. In other words, a signature is
effective if it can detect an attackwith high probability (i.e., low level
of false negatives). Moreover, the probability of classifying benign
traffic asmalicious (i.e., false positive) must be low as well. Although
every day hundreds to thousands of signatures are generated and/
or updated by institutes and companies responsible for intrusion
detection [1], attackers create variants or mutants of an intrusion
to evade detection.
Several different ways to generate an attack variant can be con-
sidered, ranging from simple interleaving of malicious data to so-
phisticated obfuscation of that. The point is that even a simple,
small modification results in a completely new attack, similar to
a new unknown zero-day attack, which requires performing the
whole process of signature generation. In an ideal world, the sig-
nature generation should be conducted automatically so that an
NIDS analyzes the incoming traffic and can distinguish between
malicious and benign traffic with regard to inherent and unique
characteristics of an attack, which offer a basis for generating the
respective signatures. Achieving this on the one hand, and on the
other hand, the problem with the derivation of an adequately spe-
cific signature are two of the greatest challenges faced by NIDS
designers today.
Another serious obstacle to the implementation of an NIDS is
how the effectiveness of the NIDS should be evaluated. To this end,
traditionally a set of malicious data should be collected to serve as
ground truth. Being close to the real traffic passing through real
networks is one the specifications of such a set. DRAPA dataset [30],
KDD Cup 99 [45], and CDX [13, 43] can be considered as attempts
to address this issue. However, they suffer from a lack of nearly real
traffic data, and they do not include traffic for all of the network
protocols [66]. As an example of remedies for this, in [46] a new
dataset called “Kyoto 2006+” for research purposes has been offered.
The authors of [46] have claimed that KDD Cup 99 [45] dataset is
old and does not reflect all variants of attacks in today’s world. In
one of the most recent attempts, the authors of [7] have combined
several types of malicious datasets available on the Internet to
produce a mixed dataset, which satisfies the requirement of having
a wide range of various attacks. They have applied a method called
“overlay methodology” to produce synthetic dataset [5]. According
to this method, data related to malware activities is merged with
benign data by sending the data to the machines on an external
network.
Despite the above, according to at least two major reasons, col-
lecting a set of malicious data providing the ground truth is not
straightforward [5]. First and foremost, typical network traces con-
tain sensitive information, which is carefully controlled and cannot
be shared with other parties. This is due to the fact that even after
a cautious anonymization process, it can be still possible to extract
some sensitive information from the data [38]. Second, given that
an NIDS is tested by feeding a small set of data, due to the het-
erogeneous nature of the real-world network traces, the results of
the test cannot be representative. Hence, it has been proposed to
use synthetic data traces, see, e.g., [64]. Nevertheless, the impact
of possible biases and limitation with respect to realism should
be considered in this case [5]. More importantly, the synthetically
generated traces mainly follow known trends such as distributions
of users, applications as well as the network behavior, and do not
reflect further detailed characteristics of the traffic, e.g., the payload
that is crucial for efficient intrusion detection. Therefore, it is of
great importance to establish a methodology which can be used to
achieve realism to a higher degree.
Furthermore, andmore crucially, when a detector is implemented
and its effectiveness against zero-day attacks should be tested, it
is necessary to generate a traffic pool reflecting the nature of the
zero-day attacks. In the literature, this has not been completely ad-
dressed so far. As a prime example, [26] re-defines zero-day attacks
as the attacks discovered after the NIDS under study is released. By
taking this into account, it has been shown that a signature-based
NIDS, namely SNORT [42], can detect a set of zero-day attacks.
Unfortunately, the issue with ground truth remains a critical chal-
lenge.
This work aims to address the challenges mentioned above by
contributing to the following points.
A novel scheme for generating attack mutants and attack
signatures
By applying a known and sound method, we demonstrate how
mutants of an attack can be generated. Our method relies on the
fact that an unknown grammar can be extracted and learned by a
recurrent neural network (RNN). This fact enables us to generate
new, unseen sequences, i.e., attack mutants. As another example of
how RNNs can be used in intrusion detection, we demonstrate that
by extracting the signatures of an NIDS and feeding them into an
RNN it is possible to generate synthetic signatures. To evaluate our
approach quantitatively, different metrics, namely Smith-Waterman
and Levenshtein distances, are used to measure the distances of the
new signatures to the original ones.
A new perspective on synthetic data generation.
The methodology that we apply in this paper can represent a
change of direction for generating synthetic data. Although we
follow the principle of the overlay methodology, we show that it
is possible to generate worm mutants as well as attack signatures,
and accordingly, the traffic flows associated with them.
Evaluating the effectiveness of an existingNIDS and suggest-
ing a method to improve it.
We suggest that by adding the signatures generated synthetically,
the effectiveness of an NIDS regarding false positives and false
negatives can be improved. We verify this empirically by applying
the proposed concept to one of the well-studied NIDS, namely
the Bro NIDS. However, the scope of our work is not restricted to
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Figure 1: In an RNN, an input from the previous state of the
hidden layer is fed into the next hidden layer designated
with a weightw . Weights corresponding to the input and the
output layers areU and V [32].
this NIDS. In other words, our methodology is applicable in other
scenarios, where a signature-based NIDS is employed to find an
intrusion.
2 NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Although we assume that the reader can be familiar with the con-
cept of regular languages, Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA), and
deep learning, we define the functions and notations used through-
out this paper. Note that standard notation is used here, as found
in [22].
Preliminaries on Formal Languages and DFAs
Consider the alphabet Σ = {0,1} and the set of all strings Σ∗ over
Σ. A set L ⊆ Σ∗ is called a language over the alphabet Σ.
A grammar is a 4-tuple (N ,V , P , S), with the sets of non-terminal
(N ) and terminal (V ) vocabularies, i.e., strings, a finite set of pro-
duction rules (P ), and the start symbol (S). For each grammar, there
exists a language corresponding to that as well as an automaton rec-
ognizing the strings of that grammar. Our focus is on deterministic
and regular grammars, which can be recognized by a DFA.
A DFA A is defined by A = (Q,δ , Σ,q0, F ) over the alphabet Σ,
where Q is the set of states, the initial state is denoted by q0, and
the accepting states are F ⊆ Q . δ : Q × Σ → Q is the transition
function defined as follows. For all q ∈ Q , a ∈ Σ and c ∈ Σ∗, we
have δ (q, λ) = q and its canonical continuation to Σ∗, i.e., δ (q,ac) =
δ (δ (q,a), c). Giving strings to A, it accepts a set of them, called its
accepted language L(A) := {c ∈ Σ∗ | δ (q0, c) ∈ F }, i.e., a regular
language.
From another perspective, particularly by taking a bottom-up
approach, regular languages can be described by their respective
regular expressions (often called, regex). In an informal and intuitive
way, regular expressions enable us to begin with building blocks
and combine them to generate other regular expressions. These
building blocks are regular expressions representing the empty
language {∅}, the language of the empty string {λ} with |λ | = 0,
and the languages of the sets containing only one alphabet of Σ, i.e.,
{a} s.t. a ∈ Σ. In order to combine these building blocks and obtain
new regular expression, we can apply the concatenation, the union,
the Kleene closure, and the intersection operators (for more details
see, e.g., [27]). It has been proved that L is a regular language iff
there is a regular expression R such that L(R) = L [27]. Moreover, it
is known that DFAs and regular expressions are equivalent, i.e., if
a language L is built up by regular expressions s.t. L(R) = L, there
exists a DFA A that accepts this language, i.e., L = L(A) [27].
Notations Related to Deep Neural Networks:
One of the functions widely applied when working with deep
learning models is (logistic) sigmoid: σ (x) = 1/1 + exp(−x). In ad-
dition to the sigmoid function, the hyperbolic tangent function,
tanh(·), is used as an activation function in deep networks.
3 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RECURRENT
NEURAL NETWORKS (RNNS)
Although the concept and applications of recurrent neural networks
(RNNs) are nowadays part of the common knowledge in our com-
munity, as a self-contained paper, our work briefly introduce the
most important concepts required to understand our method.
The concept of deep neural networks, as an approach to arti-
ficial intelligence (AI), has been first motivated by problems that
could not be addressed properly in traditional machine learning.
As examples, speech recognition and generating text [51] can be
mentioned [22]. One of the most prominent, and widely-applied
neural networks is feed-forward networks, where via a series of
weights the inputs is given to the outputs directly. Although being a
very powerful tool for several applications, feed-forward networks
cannot cope with issues, in which a sequence of inputs should be
processed. To address this, RNNs have been proposed (see, e.g., [44]),
which exhibit temporal characteristic fulfilling the conditions for
processing sequences of data.
In addition to being superior in learning sequences [23], RNNs
can be employed to generate sequences that are similar to training
sequence [32]. In Comparison to feed-forward neural networks,
each stage of an RNN has an input coming from the previous state,
in a similar way to memorizing the history of all the past states (see
Figure 1). In the fields of speech recognition and Natural Language
Processing (NLP), RNNs are usually used to predict the next word
in a sequence.
A major problem with RNNs is the vanishing or exploding gra-
dients in back-propagation process [22]. One of the first designed
RNN (so-called vanilla RNN), which is the simplest one suffers from
this problem. In other words, legacy, vanilla version of RNNs could
not save the memory for a long time and it could vanish during
the time. Consider an RNN that is trained over 10000 samples and
builds up the memory upon those. As each new sample with new
attributes arrives in a sequence, the memory is overwritten after a
while and it forgets the previous memory. Long Short-Term Mem-
ory (LSTM) RNNs have attempted to solve this problem [23]. The
concept of LSTM was first introduced in 1997 by Hochreiter and
Schmidhuber [25]. An LSTM RNN can be turned to a gated RNNs,
which has the capability to learn for a long time, and, when needed,
it has the gates to forget the memory and learn again based on
new inputs [17]. These gates also allow RNNs to pass the informa-
tion unchanged to other layers in the network, i.e., featuring read,
write and clear functions as illustrated in Figure 2b. When a gate
is open, it allows the information propagation through the gate.
More formally, in Figure 2a, it , f t , and ot are the output signals
of the corresponding input, forget, and output layers at the time
step t , whereas ht is an updated hidden state value used for the
next time step and the output to the upper layer at that time step.
Moreover, ct is the cell state (so-called, memory state) fed into the
next time step, and similarly, ct−1 is the cell state coming from
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: (a) Structure of an LSTMmemory cell. The previous states of the cell and the hidden states could be erased, updated,
and read by the gates. Squares are hyperbolic tangent activation functions and circles are logistic sigmoid activation functions,
(b) Input, output, and forget gates in an RNN with LSTM cells. These gates control the flow of information in different time
steps [17, 23].
the previous time step. And letWf ,Wi ,Wz , andWo be the input
weights related to each gates, and in a similar fashion, Rf , Ri , Rz ,
and Ro be corresponding to the recurrent inputs from the previous
states. Now the output of the input layer at the time step t can be
formulated as follows.
it = σ (Wixt + Riht−1 + bi ),
where bi is the bias for the input gate. By substituting the weights
and biases for the forget and output gates in the above equation,
we obtain the outputs of the other layers, namely f t , ot , and zt .
Finally, the cell state at the time step t is ct = f t · ct−1 + it · zt , and
the updated hidden state ht = ot · tanh(ct ).
The structure explained above enables LSTM RNNs to cope with
long-term dependencies more effectively than the simple recurrent
networks [22]. Therefore, LSTM RNNs have become powerful and
widely accepted tools for speech [24] and handwriting recognition
as well as text generation [23].
3.1 Application of RNNs in Text Generation
Sequence learning offers a wide range of applications, for instance,
natural language processing, time series prediction, and DNA se-
quencing. Due to these applications, sequence learning can be con-
sidered as a discipline or of a particular line of research developed
to address problems such as sequence prediction, sequence recogni-
tion, etc. [50]. Among those problems, sequence prediction (mostly
referred to as sequence generation) attracts a great deal of atten-
tion because of its applications in several domains of study, e.g.,
human-machine interaction [31].
After the development of RNNs in 1980s, they are widely used
in enormous studies related to sequence prediction. Giles et al.
have pursued this line of research by demonstrating fundamen-
tal strength of RNNs and their close relationship to deterministic
finite automata, see, e.g., [18–20, 40]. They began with a formal
model of sequences, i.e., formal grammar and machines generat-
ing and recognizing them, namely their respective automata. More
specifically, they have proved that RNNs can be trained to simulate
deterministic finite automata (DFA) and recognize their correspond-
ing grammar [20]. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that, even
unknown, (small) grammars can be learned and further extracted
from the RNN (i.e., generating the corresponding DFA) [19]. It
is worth noting here that the problem of grammatical inference
is proved to be NP-complete [21], and results presented by Giles
at al. are in line with heuristic approaches attempting to address
grammatical inference (see, e.g., [3]).
4 APPLICATIONS OF RNNS IN INTRUSION
DETECTION
4.1 Generating New Mutants of Polymorphic
Worm
As discussed in Section 1, one of the major obstacles that signature-
based NIDS encounter is the lack of knowledge about new variants
of an attack. As an example of attacks with enormous variants,
we focus on polymorphic worms. It is known that these worms
are able to change their behavior through generating mutants or
variants of themselves to pass through NIDS without being de-
tected. They attempt to hide their encrypted malicious code in all
variants of themselves. The notion of “generating mutants” of an
exploit has been introduced in the literature, which should not be
confused with mutation testing. Following the reasoning provided
in [63], in our scenario we generate mutants of an attack and the
targeted NIDS remains untouched, in contrast to mutation testing
approaches. An example of a mutant generator for NIDS, compati-
ble with our scenario, has been introduced in [63]. Similar to our
goal, [63] aims at evaluating the effectiveness of an NIDS by feeding
mutants of a known attack. Nonetheless, the main drawback of
their proposed method is that the mutation mechanism should be
maintained continuously. In other words, the existing mechanisms
have to be frequently updated, and more importantly, the parame-
ters reflecting the nature of an attack should be extracted before
generation process begins. This section of our paper attempts to
address these issues.
More specifically, the primary goal of our approach described in
this section is to observe if new, unseen variants or mutants of a
knownworm can be generated by an LSTM2, given some previously
collected variants of that. In particular, we take the steps illustrated
2Hereafter, we may use the terms “RNN” and “LSTM” interchangeably, since we solely
focus on and implement LSTM RNNs.
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Figure 3: Steps taken in our approach: (from left to right)
generating the worms and their mutants using the Metas-
ploit framework, then feeding them into an RNN, and fi-
nally compare the results in terms of the similarity.
in Figure 3. Tomake this observation, we first analyze different state-
of-the-art encoder engines implemented in ADMMutate [2] as well
as the Metasploit framework [57], namely the XOR encoder [60]and
the Shikata Ga Nai (in Japanese means “nothing can be done about
it”) encoder [59].
Using such encoders are crucial since when an exploit in the
form of, e.g., a shellcode is generated, it cannot be directly used.
But it should be encoded to obtain a pure alphanumeric code, by
removing bad characters (e.g., null bytes). Moreover, the encoded
exploit may suit 64-bit target systems, which can be achieved by
deploying an encoder. For instance, in the Metasploit framework,
the XOR encoder [60] employs an 8-byte key and leverages relative
addressing used by x64 operating systems, whereas the Shikata Ga
Nai encoder is a polymorphic XOR additive feedback encoder for the
x86 architecture. The decoder stub of this encoder is generated by
substituting the instructions and ordering the blocks dynamically.
In this regard, after each iteration different outputs are generated in
the hope that signature recognition can be prevented. Furthermore,
the key used by the encoder is modified through additive feedback.
Additionally, the decoder stub is also obfuscated (for more details,
see [14] ). Beside the XOR and Shikata Ga Nai encoders, we also
consider the ADMMutate engine exhibiting the following features.
The payloads are encoded by applying 16-bit sliding keys. Moreover,
the ADMMutate supports randomized NOP generation, banned
characters, insertion of non-destructive junk instructions and the
reordering/substitution of code as well as polymorphic payload
decoder generation with multiple code paths [63].
Comparing the Shikata Ga Nai encoder with the XOR encoder,
as indicated by Metasploit [57], it is expected that Shikata Ga Nai
encoder outperforms the XOR encoder. However, successful detec-
tion of exploits using these encoders have been reported in the
literature, see, e.g., [47] . This is due to the fact that these encoders
leave traces in the encoded payload that can be used to detect the
exploit. A visual, effective procedure proposed in [47] to illustrate
such traces for, e.g., Shikata Ga Nai encoder. We follow that proce-
dure to see if for the ADMMutate, the XOR, and the Shikata Ga Nai
encoders any pattern can be observed, which can be further used
by an LSTM to generate new mutant of a worm.
To this end, we define the following setting. Without loss of
generality, to generate exploits in the form of bash files, we apply
the Shikata Ga Nai, XOR, and ADMMutate encoders to the OS X x64
Shell Bind TCP payload [58], which binds an arbitrary command to
Figure 4: So-called spectral images illustrating the patterns
(the visible columns) formed by the bytes repeated in the
same places within all encoded bash files. In all examples,
each row of the pixels shows a decoder generated by an en-
gine, whereas each pixel corresponds to a byte of that de-
coder. Although in comparison to the XOR encoder (left)
such patterns are less visible for the Shikata Ga Nai (mid-
dle) encoder and ADMMutate (right), they can be still distin-
guished.
a port chosen by the attacker. Moreover, the number of iterations
for each encoder varies from zero (i.e., without encoding) to 100 so
that 101 bash scripts are generated. These bash files are sorted in
matrices in a row-wise manner. Note that we add padding (all zero
values) at the end of the rows to obtain rows with the same length
since for these encoders, the outputs of these encoders are non-
fixed length bash files. Afterwards, the matrices are displayed as
grayscale images, where a byte value of 0x00 (0xFF) corresponds to
a black (white) pixel. Figure 4 shows portions of the worms encoded
by the Shikata Ga Nai, XOR, and ADMMutate encoders.
The most important message to be conveyed here is that the
bash files generated by applying the above-mentioned encoding
engines do not comprise of completely, and truly random values. In
other words, there are some patterns, i.e., the bytes repeated in the
same places within all bash files, which form the visible columns in
Figure 4. This is in line with what has been observed in [34], where
the approach relying on finding unavoidable byte patterns is called
“content-based”. According to this definition, our approach can be
classified as content-based as well. The main advantage of such
approaches is that there exists no dependency on protocol or server
information [34]. As well described by Li et al., in the real-world,
the protocol frame part and the control data of the worm cannot be
manipulated by an attacker to obtain a new mutant of a worm [34].
These parts create patterns that can be indeed used by an LSTM
network to generate similar and unseen bash files as mutants of
the original payload.
More formally, by providing examples of worms we train our
LSTMs to learn and extract rules corresponding to a DFA A, as
proved by Giles et al. [19]. This can be explained by the fact that
the grammar of bounded-length strings is regular. Recall that there
is a one-to-one mapping between a DFA and its grammar. Let the
grammar corresponding to the DFA A be denoted by (N ,V , P , S),
and the language generated by this grammar be L′. In fact, L′ =
Enc(L), where Enc(·) represent the encoding operation applied to
encode the original language generating a worm L. After training,
the grammar (N ,V , P , S) is used by the LSTM to generate unseen
strings, which belong to L′.
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Figure 5: Our framework to extend and enhance an exist-
ing NIDS: (from left to right) extraction of the signatures
stored in the database of the NIDS, then feeding them into
an RNN, and at the end the synthetic signatures generated
by the RNN used to extend the database of the signatures.
Up to this point, we have discussed the first two steps of our
approach shown in Figure 3, namely generating the original worms
and their respective mutants by applying the concept of LSTM. In
Section 6, we discuss the last step that is computing the similarity
or the distance score. Additionally, we provide the results that we
obtain through empirical evaluation of our approach in Section 6.
4.2 Generating Synthetic Signatures
As discussed in Section 1, we mainly focus on signature-based
intrusion detection methods exhibiting a lower level of false pos-
itives, compared to anomaly-based detectors. The popularity of
signature-based methods NIDS can stem from this fact [37]. As a
prime example of such popular NIDS, one can mention Bro [61]
and Snort [42]. Albeit significant developments and improvements
in the design of signature-based NIDS, attackers are often steps
ahead of these defense systems. This can be explained by the fact
that nowadays, a wide range of methods and tools are accessible by
an attacker, and the attack patterns and behaviors change rapidly.
Generation of signatures for known attacks has become a mature
area of research. In this context, numerous approaches applying
various methodologies, ranging from machine learning and data
mining (see, for example, [33, 62]) to matrix factorization [29], have
been proposed in the literature. Nevertheless, our work does not
share a great deal of commonality with these approaches. It is due
to our approach that can be seen as an add-on to each and every
NIDS to improve the effectiveness of that. One can observe a closer
relationship between our approach and studies discussing synthetic
data generation for evaluation of NIDS, e.g., [6]. A comparison be-
tween the method employed in [6] and our approach can explain
why we shift our focus to RNNs from Markov chain models, as pro-
posed by Bar et al. [6]. Although being a predominant framework
for different applications, Markov chain models suffer, in particular,
from the following disadvantages. They need a significant amount
of knowledge of a task performed by them. Moreover, the assump-
tions underlying the design of these chains can be questionable, e.g.,
the dependency assumptions. Our RNN-based approach attempts
to address these issue.
Although we do not limit our approach to Bro NIDS, we take that
as a prime example of a popular signature-based NIDS. The Bro is
an open source application running on Unix based systems. It has
its own scripting language, enabling users to write the user-specific
events and logs scripts. Additionally, the Bro has the capability of
changing the structure at many levels according to the user de-
mands. It supports many popular transmission protocols and is
able to analyze them. Moreover, it can extract the data packets and
match the data with the predefined rules. Last but not least, the Bro
supports regular expression for pattern matching [61]. In more de-
tails, in each signature embedded in the Bro, the information related
to the payload of the attack is represented by its corresponding
regular expression.
The latter feature of the Bro is interesting from the point of view
of our methodology. As can be seen in Figure 5, which illustrates
our roadmap for generating synthetic signatures, the signatures of
the Bro is fed into an LSTM. More precisely, the regular expression
R related to the payload of an attack is given to the LSTM. When
the LSTM learns the DFA associated with R, it extract the DFA A
such that L(R) = L, and equivalently, L = L(A). In the next step, the
LSTM uses the information about L, andA to generate another valid
regular expression R′, where L(R′) = L. Afterwards, the languages
L and L′ = L(R′) can be combined by using, e.g., the union operator
to obtain an enhanced regular language L ∪ L′, with the associated
regular expression R ∪ R′. This union can be used as a substitute
for R to improve the detection rate of the Bro. We evaluate this
quantitatively and present the results of deploying this method in
Section 6.
5 EXPERIMENT DESCRIPTION
Before providing the results achieved by experimentally evaluating
the performance of our methods (see Section 4), here we first intro-
duce the metrics, experimental setup, and explain the design of the
experiment.
5.1 Metrics
We define two comprehensive sets of metrics used for (1) computing
the distance, or equivalently, comparing the similarity between the
original sample (i.e., a set of original worms or Bro signatures) and
samples generated by an RNN, and (2) evaluating the performance
of the enhanced Bro in practice.
Similarity Comparison (Distance Measuring)
In order to examine how good the outputs of the RNN are, i.e.,
how far they are from the original samples, two famous similarity
metrics are taken into account.
Levenshtein distance: this distance metric defines how many sub-
stitutions, deletions or insertions are required to transform one
string to another one. To assess the similarity of two strings, this
metric has been used in the intrusion detection-related literature,
e.g., [9, 55]. Beside that, it has its drawbacks: the main drawback of
the Levenshtein algorithm is that it focuses on the global compari-
son between two strings, i.e., among all the variables in two strings.
For example, the Levenshtein similarity percentage between “John
Smith” and “Smith, John” equals zero. While we are interested in
performing local similarity comparisons to find all pairs of sub-
strings in two strings, we consider the Smith-Waterman distance
as well.
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Batch size 1
Learning rate 0.001
Number of the epochs 100
Number of the hidden layer 2
Word vector size 64
Sequence Length 1
Table 1: The LSTM configuration for our experiments.
signature dpd_ssh_client }
ip-proto == tcp
payload /ˆ [sS][sS][hH]-[12]/˙
requires-reverse-signature dpd_ssh_server
enable "ssh"
tcp-state originator}
Table 2: The Bro Signature for SSH Client protocol [56].
Smith-Waterman distance: the Smith-Waterman algorithm is an
alignment algorithm [39], which gives a score to the strings. This
score is based on a calculation of three main factor, namely match,
mismatch, and the penalty score. A match is mostly a positive
number, and it indicates that one character is aligned to a character
in another string, whereas any mismatch reduces the score. The
penalty score is reduced from the score and indicates how long
one match score could continue. In [8], it is demonstrated that the
maximum score is not a factor of similarity and should be further
normalized. The authors of [4] have addressed this by suggesting
a new normalized factor based on the local distance between the
position of the maximum score and the starting point, where the
score is zero.We follow their procedure to compute the (normalized)
similarity percentage between two strings.
Assessing the Quality of an NIDS
To evaluate how the quality of an NIDS in terms of attack detec-
tion is improved by employing our approach, we use the following
metrics.
False Positives (FP): the number of cases, where the NIDS improp-
erly indicates a flow from the benign dataset as malicious.
False Negatives (FN): the number of cases, where a flow from the
malicious dataset is not detected by the NIDS.
5.2 Setup of the Experiments
The hardware that we have used in our experiments are commer-
cially available laptops, and a GPU (Graphics Processing Unit)
server. The laptops act as either a user device to send traffic to
the NIDS or a platform, on which Bro NIDS is run. Each laptop is
equipped with an Intel Core i7 - 2.6 GHz (4 Cores 8 Threads) CPU
and a 16 GB DDR3 RAM, and its operating system is Linux (Ubuntu
64 Bit).
Moreover, in line with other AI-related research studies, we use
GPU clusters rather than CPU (Central Processing Units) comput-
ing resources. This is due to the performance and computational
speed of GPU clusters in comparison to CPU ones in deep learning
tasks [10, 41]. In addition to an Intel Core i7 - 3.4 GHz (6 cores 12
Threads) CPU, our GPU server composed of two Nvidia 1080-Ti
GPU cards, and a 128 GB DDR4 RAM. On our server, we run Linux
(Ubuntu 64 Bit) and Torch accounting for deep learning tasks. Torch
supporting Lua is selected due to the availability of many models
for RNNs and LSTMs and the ability to run the algorithms on the
GPUs. Furthermore, Torch is one of the best tools for small-scale
projects and fast prototyping.
5.3 Experiment Design
Generating New Mutants of Polymorphic Worms
As discussed in Section 4.1, we take into account the polymorphic
worms generated by employing the XOR, the Shikata Ga Nai, and
the ADMMutate encoders. Besides that, in our view, each worm is a
string of bytes and depending on no protocol or server information,
in line with the content-based approach taken in [34]. In this regard,
we generate variants of the OS X x64 Shell Bind TCP payload [58],
with the different number of encoding iterations: without encoding,
one iteration, etc. Worms mutants are then saved as a text file.
Before feeding the text files into the LSTM, some preprocessing is
needed to change the text into an understandable format for the
RNN. Preprocessing here refers to the process of converting a text to
the vectors of numbers to be understandable for the neural network.
There are several ways to convert a text to a vector, e.g., using word
to vector algorithms or decoding the text into the Unicode system.
Selecting the appropriate model depends on the context of the data.
For instance, using a word to vector models is more beneficial,
when there exists a text written in a natural language. Here in the
preprocessing step, we use the UTF-8 encoder for the purpose of
converting a text to a vector.
For each worm as an input to the LSTM, the network is config-
ured individually based on the number of the characters composing
the worm. For instance, when a worm file contains 100 characters,
the number of nodes in each hidden layer is set to 100. Moreover, we
feed each and every worm only once. Table 1 presents more details
about the configuration of the LSTMs used in our experiments.
Generating Signatures of Bro
Bro analyzer supports several different Internet protocols. This
means that some of the attacks launched via these protocols have
been analyzed and their signatures are extracted and added into
the Bro signature set. Seventeen of these signatures related to the
attacks via HTTP, SMTP, POP3, FTP, etc. are selected to feed into
the LSTM. As an example of these signatures, Table 2 presents
the signature for SSH protocol. A Bro signature has mainly two
parts, namely conditions and actions. Conditions are defined for
the header and the content of the packet. In the content conditions,
matching occurs against the payload part of the packet. The second
part, an action, is the response given by the Bro system, when a sig-
nature matching happens, e.g., rising individual events or enabling
a special analyzer for the matched protocols or data [56].
Post-processing the outputs of the LSTM
The RNN generates an output according to its pre-trained model
for each signature. These outputs have the same number of charac-
ters as the corresponding inputs. Each output should be recognized
in the Bro system as a regular expression term. Therefore, some
editing is needed such as closing the open brackets or removing
the slashes appearing in the middle of the output string. Theses
minor modification can be easily done by an operator, or even, a
scrip can be developed to perform this task.
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1 100
2 58.6 100
3 65.5 58.4 100
1* 50.4 48.1 49.1 100
2* 49 52.2 48.8 46.2 100
3* 47.8 47.9 48.6 49.6 47.8 100
1 2 3 1* 2* 3*
1 100
2 60.7 100
3 66.4 55.8 100
1* 55 49.5 52.6 100
2* 51.5 58.9 51 48.3 100
3* 52 47.2 54.4 53.1 48.5 100
1 2 3 1* 2* 3*
Table 3: The Smith-Waterman similarity between the worms generated by the XOR encoder. RNN generated mutants of three
worms are labeled with a star. In this experiment, the worms are given to the LSTM individually and one-by-one. The match
value equals is set to 1 (left) and 5 (right). The example numbermarkedwith a star shows the corresponding example generated
by the LSTM.
1 100
2 59.9 100
3 59.1 58 100
1* 49.6 49 51.2 100
2* 49.7 49.7 50.9 50 100
3* 50.6 50.7 54.1 51.1 53.4 100
1 2 3 1* 2* 3*
1 100
2 58.2 100
3 59.9 58.8 100
1* 54.3 52.6 52.3 100
2* 51.6 53.5 50.4 51.3 100
3* 54.6 51.6 58.2 54.2 55 100
1 2 3 1* 2* 3*
Table 4: Results of the experiment for Shikata Ga Nai encoder (the same setting as for the Table 3).
1 100
2 44.8 100
3 47.3 64.2 100
1* 52.5 46.6 48.7 100
2* 48.7 92.9 56.5 49.4 100
3* 46.8 49.9 57 49.7 52.3 100
1 2 3 1* 2* 3*
1 100
2 47 100
3 48 64.2 100
1* 58.2 47.2 48 100
2* 41.2 96.3 59.8 38 100
3* 49.6 55.3 64.1 51.6 56.8 100
1 2 3 1* 2* 3*
Table 5: Results of the experiment for the ADMMutate encoder (the same setting as for the Table 3).
6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
6.1 Similarity between original and
RNN-generated Worms
As discussed in Section 5.1, due to the drawbacks of the Levenshtein
approach for comparing the distance between strings, we mainly
focus on the results achieved by using the Smith-Waterman metric.
Here, for the sake of completeness, we briefly present the Leven-
shtein similarity percentages (see [8]) computed for our worms.
We choose three worms generated as described in 5.3 and com-
pute the Levenshtein similarity percentages between the original
worm and their corresponding RNN-generated ones. Note that for
the XOR engine, the numbers of characters in the worms are 606,
777, and 952. This number is 606, 724, and 842 for Shikata Ga Nai
engine and 606, 1946, and 1946 for ADMMutate engine. For worms
encoded by the XOR engine, the average of the Levenshtein sim-
ilarity percentage is 48.9%, whereas for the Shikata Ga Nai and
ADMMutate engines, it is 49.43% and 31.46%, respectively.
Table 3 to Table 5 show the (normalized) Smith-Waterman simi-
larity percentages between mutants of the worms themselves and
the RNN generated mutants, marked with a star. Note that since the
normalized values (over the length of the matching substrings) are
reported, the length of the worms can be discarded. As expected,
the Smith-Waterman Algorithm shows a sufficiently high similarity
ratio for the worms here. Furthermore, when increasing the match
value from one to five, the similarity percentages between worms
remain in the same order of magnitude. Remarkable is that the
similarity percentage, and accordingly the distances, between the
mutants of the worms generated by the RNN (synthetic mutants)
themselves, and between synthetic mutants and original ones are
similar to the distances between an original mutant and other orig-
inal mutants of a worm. This is an interesting and important result
since we consider the normalized similarity percentage. Therefore,
this result demonstrates that the LSTM not only can learn and
extract the grammars underlying the given worms, but also can
generate substrings with the same similarity percentage.
It can be thought that if instead of feeding the worms one-by-one,
a set of worms is given to the LSTM, the similarity percentages
can be different. We examine this by choosing a set of 5 worms,
each with a different number of encoding iterations, namely, one
to five iterations. These worms are concatenated together into a
single text file that is given to the LSTM. The results achieved for
the XOR, Shikata Ga Nai, and ADMMutate encoders are shown in
Table 6 to Table 8. In this case, an improvement in the similarity
percentages (on average) can be observed. This can be explained by
the fact that the LSTM network is definitely larger than the network
used for the other experiment (Table 3 to Table 5) due to the larger
number of characters in the text file given to that 3. Additionally, by
giving more examples to the LSTM, it can improve its prediction by
observing the examples with the same grammar. Nonetheless, when
having only one example of a worm (i.e., one mutant of that), it is
still possible to obtain a close-enough unseen mutant, as presented
in our previous experiments (Table 3 to Table 5).
3Recall that in our experiments the number of nodes in each hidden layer equals the
number of characters in the given example.
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1 100
2 65.3 100
3 65.3 62.9 100
4 67.6 62.9 72.2 100
5 62.9 67.6 65.3 65.3 100
1* 48.7 49.8 49.8 49 51.7 100
2* 49.4 49.4 50.3 51.3 50.5 50.2 100
3* 49.9 50.3 49.7 49.4 49.8 50 49.4 100
4* 47.1 48.1 47.7 47.7 48.4 46.2 49.6 49.7 100
5* 49.6 50.3 50.7 50.7 49.3 49.7 48.9 50.1 51.2 100
1 2 3 4 5 1* 2* 3* 4* 5*
1 100
2 66.5 100
3 66.5 64.6 100
4 68.7 64 72.9 100
5 64.8 68.4 66.3 66.3 100
1* 54.1 55.5 55.3 54.2 53.4 100
2* 54.8 54.5 55.6 55.6 55 53.9 100
3* 55.5 54.5 56 56.8 55.5 54.2 55.2 100
4* 52.7 52.7 53.4 53.9 52.9 53.3 54.3 53.3 100
5* 54.2 54.8 55.1 55.3 53.9 54.8 54.2 54.6 56.1 100
1 2 3 4 5 1* 2* 3* 4* 5*
Table 6: The Smith-Waterman similarity between theworms generated by the XOR encoder, with the same number of iteration.
In this experiment, we feed a set of fiveworms, all together, into the LSTM. Thematch value equals is set to 1 (left) and 5 (right).
1 100
2 67.1 100
3 61.7 58 100
4 58.8 57.5 60.8 100
5 62.6 57.7 59.8 59.4 100
1* 47.9 48.1 47.7 47.9 48.3 100
2* 48.1 47 47.6 46.6 47.5 50.2 100
3* 53 52 52.7 52 52.3 50.1 46.7 100
4* 48.7 48.2 48.5 47.3 47.8 48.4 48.9 48.5 100
5* 47.4 47.1 47.1 46.9 46.7 46.5 47.1 45.9 49.1 100
1 2 3 4 5 1* 2* 3* 4* 5*
1 100
2 68.2 100
3 62.5 59.8 100
4 60.2 59.8 61.9 100
5 64 59.7 61.5 61 100
1* 53.5 53.9 53.7 53.7 53.5 100
2* 52.9 53.7 53.8 53.3 56 55.3 100
3* 56 55.9 57.3 55.4 54.6 53.9 53.6 100
4* 55.5 54.9 55.1 54.6 54 54.1 54.5 53.9 100
5* 53.8 54.1 52.1 53.3 53.4 53.4 52.3 53.5 53 100
1 2 3 4 5 1* 2* 3* 4* 5*
Table 7: Results of the experiment for the Shikata Ga Nai encoder (the same setting as for the Table 6).
1 100
2 86.1 100
3 90.8 83.8 100
4 86.1 83.8 83.8 100
5 88.5 88.5 83.8 86.1 100
1* 58 53 65.2 53.4 53.2 100
2* 52.6 47.8 61.2 48 48 68.6 100
3* 56.6 54.4 65.2 50.8 53.1 63.5 65 100
4* 54.4 47.9 63.5 48.2 48.1 68.6 87.3 70.1 100
5* 54 66.5 52.2 52.3 56.3 57.8 55 52.8 55 100
1 2 3 4 5 1* 2* 3* 4* 5*
1 100
2 86.1 100
3 90.8 83.8 100
4 87.6 86.6 85.2 100
5 89.8 88.5 83.8 87.5 100
1* 63.4 57.9 70.6 58.5 58.3 100
2* 56.8 52 64.4 53.2 52.4 69.6 100
3* 62.1 58.2 70.3 58.1 57 68.2 71.1 100
4* 58.3 51.6 67.5 53.4 51.9 72.2 90.8 73.8 100
5* 58.6 71.7 56.6 59.1 60.9 62.7 59.4 58.4 59.2 100
1 2 3 4 5 1* 2* 3* 4* 5*
Table 8: Results of the experiment for the ADMMutate encoder (the same setting as for the Table 6).
6.2 Similarity between original and
RNN-generated Bro Signatures
Following the same procedure described in Section 6.1, we feed
the Bro signature individually into the LSTM. Afterwards, we com-
pute the Levenshtein and Smith-Waterman similarity percentages
between the Bro signature and their associated signatures gener-
ated by the LSTM. In this scenario, alike the previous scenario
explained in Section 6.1, the similarity percentages between the
LSTM-generated signatures and the original ones demonstrate that
the LSTM could find some patterns, and based on them generate
a similar signature with low distance from the Bro signature, see
Table 9. It is worth noting here that the synthetic signatures should
be solely sufficiently close to the original ones. In other words, in
order to provide an NIDS (in our case the Bro) with effective signa-
tures, we should feed new signatures that are similar to the known
signatures, but also represent variants of the respective attack.
Comparing the Smith-Waterman and the Levenshtein similarity
percentages shown in Table 9, as expected, these percentages are
not always consistent. This is due to the fact that the Levenshtein
similarity percentage can reflect the results of the global comparison
between two strings. On the contrary, the Smith-Waterman simi-
larity percentage present the local, sub-string-based comparison
between two strings. Although at first glance, it seems surprising
that in some cases the Levenshtein similarity percentages are higher
than the Smith-Waterman ones, the length of the examples (i.e.,
the number of the characters in the signature) can explain this.
For shorter signatures, and smaller LSTM networks equivalently,
the number of characters given to the network is not sufficient
enough for the LSTM to extract and learn the grammar underlying
the strings. And, therefore, the LSTM may repeat the same char-
acters. In contrast to this for longer signatures, the LSTM extract
the grammar and generate new substrings that locally match the
substrings of the given signature. Hence, we suggest that for differ-
ent signatures with various lengths, one should compute both the
Smith-Waterman and the Levenshtein similarity percentages.
6.3 Enhancing the performance of the Bro
Here we aim to evaluate the performance (regarding the metrics
introduced in 5.1) of the Bro, whose set of signatures is expanded
by adding the synthetic signatures generated by the LSTMs. At the
first stage, it is necessary to collect appropriate samples of network
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traffic flows. To collect a pool of the benign traffic flows, we run
Wireshark [15] on a laptop connected to our campus network and
capture 6546 packets (50.2 MB in total). As shown in [34, 54], the
size of the data pool of the benign traffic may not significantly
influence the performance of an NIDS under test. Hence, we stick
to the number of packets mentioned above.
We generate a pool of the malicious data by using not only the
signatures embedded in the Bro, but also our synthetic signatures.
Both of these sets of the signatures are given to an inverse regular
expression generator. The result is then mapped to hosts that are
not involved in the benign traffic flows. As can be understood,
we follow an overlay-like procedure to generate our pools and
combine them. Most importantly, as advised in [5], we do not map
all the malicious traffic to one host, but randomly we choose a host
from a set of hosts, absent in the benign traces. In this way, we
leverage the advantages of the overlay method, namely providing
a better understanding of a real-world scenario and ground truth,
and accordingly a fair method to estimate the performance of an
NIDS. Moreover, since it is possible to map more than one malicious
traffic to a host, there are cases for “concurrent infections” caused
by the same host [5, 49]. Employing our procedure, we generate
3061 malicious traffic packet (3.2 MB in total).
To evaluate the performance of the Bro in terms of the FP and the
FN, four different scenarios are taken into account. First, we apply
Bro detector against solely the benign traffic to calculate the FP. The
alarm events for only the signatures of the Bro are activated. The
FP equals zero in this scenario. The second scenario is similar to
the first one, but the FN of the Bro is tested by giving a mixed pool
of the benign and malicious traffic flows. In this case FN = 4.15%.
In the third and fourth scenarios, we extend the set of Bro sig-
natures by adding our LSTM-generated signatures. In the third
case, we calculate the FP for the extended, enhanced Bro. The re-
sult (FP = 0%) demonstrates that adding new signatures does not
impair the performance of the Bro in terms of the FP. In the fourth
scenario, we calculate the FN of the Bro, when our synthetic signa-
tures are activated as well. In this case, our synthetic signatures are
configured as the Bro signatures in a signature script to match the
new activities or malware. We obtain FN = 3.12%, which shows
that the performance of the Bro is indeed improved. Note that this
result is achieved by adding solely a small set of new signatures,
namely seventeen signatures. And perhaps the reduction in the FN
rate cannot completely illustrate the potential of our approach. The
number of the alarms raised by the Bro running against the same
pool of mixed data can indicate how much improvement can be
achieved by applying our method. In the second scenario (without
the synthetic signatures) the number of alarms is 2662, whereas in
the last scenario, where the synthetic signatures are also activated
the number of alarms is 2761.
7 CONCLUSION AND REMARKS
This paper provides a framework for applying deep learning tech-
niques in the area of cyber security. While zero-day attacks are
vastly propagated in the network, our approach attempts to improve
the ability of NIDS systems to defend against them by (1) extending
their signature databases, and (2) generating a more realistic and
close to the real-world ground truth to test an NIDS.
Protocol # Characters in
signature
Levenshtein
Similarity [%] [67]
Smith-Waterman
Similarity [%]
SOCKS 214 25.23 81.3
DNP3 38 84.21 47.6
RFB 30 80 35.9
KRB 314 16.24 89.7
FTP 100 49 55.7
Tunnels 142 54.93 83.9
DCE/RPC 36 75 29.1
SMTP 108 54.63 65.5
SIP 173 46.82 77.5
RDP 98 58.04 87.8
SSH 62 58.06 48.1
SSL 357 40.06 68.8
IRC 359 42.62 57.4
XMPP 72 80.56 46.3
DHCP 30 80 26.7
HTTP 406 78.82 27.7
POP3 141 59.57 59.3
Table 9: The Levenshtein and Smith-Waterman similarity
percentages between Bro signatures and the LSTM gener-
ated ones.
More specifically, we take advantage of the immense power of
the recurrent neural networks in distinguishing complex patterns
in a text and generating similar ones. As an example of possible
application of these networks in intrusion detection, an LSTM is
used to generate several mutants of polymorphic worms. These
synthetic worms are evaluated by applying two powerful similarity
metrics, namely the Levenshtein the Smith-Waterman similarity
percentages. Furthermore, as another example of how RNNs can be
beneficial to intusion detection, we demonstrate that an LSTM can
be used to generate synthetic signatures to enhance the detection
rate of an NIDS.
Last but not least, although the applications of our methodology
in other fields of study have been widely studied and accepted in the
literature, this paper paves the way for a more detailed exploration
of the capacity of this method in cyber security.
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